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DEVELOPMENT OF SCOPE OF REVIEW IN
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION: MANDAMUS AND REVIEW
OF DISCRETIONt
HAROLD WEINTRAUB*

TIIE articulated

major premise of judicial review of administrative

action from its virtual beginnings on the English side of the Atlantic
has been the supremacy of the courts to examine the actions of inferior
bodies and tribunals to assure that they adhere to the law.' The fundamental principle of judicial review was established early in the history
of our own nation by Chief justice John Marshall,' and was voiced even
earlier by New York's leading jurist, Chancellor (then Supreme Court
Justice) James Kent.3
In its beginnings in New York, judicial review of administrative action
was largely concerned with the narrow question of jurisdiction, which
had been traditionally governed by certiorari proceedings. An official
duty to act, in the nature of a ministerial capacity, under specified conditions as prescribed by law, was made subject to a writ of mandamus.
Subject to minor variations, this state of affairs continued well past the
middle of the nineteenth century when the scope of review upon certiorari
was enlarged to provide for broader judicial examination of administrative actions of a judicial nature.4 Later the best improvisations in the
field of common-law certiorari review were codified into the Code of
Civil Procedure, 5 providing specific statutory standards for scope of
review, and these remained virtually unchanged' until the advent of
the Civil Practice Law and Rules.'
' This paper is a revised part of a study entitled Development of Judicial Revier, of
Administrative Action in New York, submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science at New York University School of Law.
The first century of the development of judicial review of administrative action in
New York was treated by the author in Mandamus and Certiorari in New York From
the Revolution to ISSO: A Chapter in Legal History, 32 Fordbam L. Rev. 631 (1964).
Subsequent installments will deal with Certiorari and Substantial Evidence and Administrative Construction of Statutory Provisions.
* Mlember of the New York Bar.
1. Bagg's Case, 11 Co. 93b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (K.B. 1615); Bonham's Casi. 8 Co. 107a,
77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1610).
2. Mlarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. People v. Sessions of Chenango, 2 Cai. Cas. 319 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1799).
4 People ex rel. Cook v. Board of Police, 39 N.Y. 506 (168).
5. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1S80, ch. 16, § 2140.
6. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 526, §§ 1296(6), (7); N.Y. S ss. Laws 1920, ch. 925, § 1304.
7. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & R. 7803.
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For mandamus, the rule for review remained, at the end of the nineteenth century, in the same state as it was when imported from the
mother country. It functioned in a narrow and limited orbit. The Code
of Civil Procedure did not follow certiorari in prescribing broad avenues
of judicial authority as a basis for the scope of review by mandamus.8
Although mandamus remained free and unfettered, from a lack of
statutory prescription, to respond to the needs and demands placed upon
it by the rapid changes taking place at the turn of the century, this
potential was not utilized for a considerable period.
Under the judicial interpretations placed upon it in the decades following adoption of the Code in 1880, mandamus continued to be narrowly
confined to use where a duty was claimed to be lodged by law in a certain
body or officer to perform a particular action in a prescribed manner without any element of choice, discretion or judgment. In one situation,
People ex rel. Wooster v. Maker,' which is characteristic of the disinclination of the courts to mandate administrative action where any
possible basis for the exercise of discretion could be spelled out, a
mandamus was refused. Although the language of the applicable statute
was couched in peremptory terms, 10 the court held, nevertheless, that
it was the intent behind the statute which was to govern the disposition
of the application and not the plain terminology of it. The intent was to
be ascertained from the scope of the authority granted, the character
of the agency or officer and the nature of the particular duty to be performed. The facts in the Wooster case show to what lengths the courts
of that period would go to avoid placing administrative action, except
the obviously ministerial, under judicial scrutiny and restraint. The
mandamus was brought against the Mayor of the City of Albany to
compel him to cause removal of a house porch encroaching more than
thirteen feet into a street. General term" affirmed the issuance of a
8. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1880, ch. 16, §§ 2067-90.
9. 141 N.Y. 330, 36 N.E. 396 (1894).
10. "If any building now erected, or hereafter to be erected shall stand upon or project
beyond the range of the street, the city engineer shall, upon receipt of written directions
from the mayor, send written notice thereof to the owner or person erecting or maintaining
the same who shall, within ten days after the receipt of such notice remove the said buildings to the range of the street laid down by the city engineer, and in case of neglect or
refusal of said owner or person erecting the same to comply with said notice, the city
engineer shall cause said removal to be made, and return the expense thereof to the board
of contract and apportionment, to the end that said expense may be assessed and collected,
and the board of contract and apportionment are hereby empowered to assess said expense
upon the property of such owner in the manner prescribed by this act." N.Y. Sess. Laws
1888, ch. 398, tit. 13, § 10.
11. 64 Hun 408, 19 N.Y. Supp. 758 (3d Dep't 1892).
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peremptory mandamus against the mayor by special term, which had
directed him to take legal proceedings for the removal of the encroachment. It was the view of the lower courts that there was a clear, mandatory duty imposed upon the mayor to act in such circumstances.
The court of appeals, consulting the factors relating to legislative
intent referred to above, recognized that "the court is not permitted to
substitute its judgment for that of the officer or body clothed by the law
with power to decide."' ' It ruled that the order requested by petitioner
actually involved a question of the mayor's exercise of discretion and
reversed the order which had awarded a peremptory mandamus. Despite
the monitory language of the statute, the court decided that this was an
area where larger circumstances governed the mandatory power apparently given to the mayor in the statute. 3 Perhaps full cognizance
of all the circumstances impinging upon the problem would allow "shall"
to be interpreted to mean "may."4 The court acknowledged that it is
sometimes difficult to determine whether the performance of an act by a
government official is in its essential nature peremptory or discretionary,
mandatory or directory. However, the absence of an individual interest
or right in this particular case on the part of the relator may have
contributed to the result ultimately reached by the court. Here was a
sphere where discretion rather than absolute rule was considered to be
the most desirable policy because a mandatory power might not always
serve the public weal. An atmosphere of restraint pervaded this opinion,
which sought and found sanction in the statute and its legislative history
to allow room for the mayor to exercise "judgment and discretion."'"
An apparent rule of law was transformed by the court into a matter of
ostensible legislative policy, intended to allow broader scope to the
mayor to exercise his discretion in dealing with problems arising under
the statute.
As the foregoing case amply demonstrates, the court of appeals, at
the turn of the century, showed a strong reluctance, except in the plainest
instances, to intrude itself into the affairs of government by means
of mandamus. Administrative action involving exercise of judgment
or in pursuance of authority to exercise discretion was immune to
12. 141 N.Y. at 337, 36 N.E. at 397; cf. Ciminera v. Sabm, 4 N.Y.2d 4cD, 151 N.E.2d 832,
176 N.Y.S.2d 257 (195); Walsh v. LaGuardia, 269 N.Y. 437, 199 N.E. 652 (1936); People
ex rel. Pumpyansky v. Keating, 16S N.Y. 390, 61 N.E. 637 (1901). See also Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (regarding principle that the spirit
of the law should prevail over the letter of the law).
13. 141 N.Y. at 339, 36 N.E. at 398.
14. See Dr. Bloom Dentist, Inc. v. Cruise, 259 N.Y. 353, 1S2 N.E. 16 (1932).
15. 141 N.Y. at 339, 36 N.E. at 393.
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judicial review unless the relator could show that the action was of a
judicial nature, thereby rendering it subject to review by certiorari. The
label of judicial action, which had been loosely applied by the courts
in the latter part of the nineteenth century in order to preclude judicial
review by mandamus,' 6 was again employed, but this time in reverse
fashion; there was now a sparing use in order to narrow the cases which
could be made subject to review by certiorari. This development
ultimately led to revision of the long standing rule in mandamus actions,
which had confined its authority to ministerial duties alone, in order
to allow for some review of the exercise of administrative judgment or
discretion. The alteration in the rule culminated from a rather involved
series of cases.
The standard rule in mandamus review, of confining itself to ordering
ministerial action, was reiterated in a leading case, People ex rel. Harris
v. Commissioners of the Land Office,17 involving a claim for reimbursement against state officials for the failure of title to lands acquired upon
a state tax sale. Under law, in such cases, it was the duty of the land
commissioners to pay back the original purchase money and interest.
They refused to do so in this instance, despite a state comptroller's
holding which cancelled the original tax sale. Defendant land commissioners countered by claiming that they were acting judicially in denying
relator's claim and, therefore, his remedy was not by mandamus.
The office of mandamus to compel performance only of a purely
ministerial duty was set forth by the court 8 in conjunction with an
admonition that it is never issued to compel the discharge of a duty
involving the exercise of judgment or discretion. Any departure from
this apparently salutary rule would result in the court's substituting
its judgment or discretion for that of duly constituted officials. In such
a case, i.e., where the decision of a question of fact or the exercise of discretion in deciding whether an act should be done or not is involved, the duty
was regarded as judicial, and mandamus cannot lie to compel its performance. 9
The court then proceeded to analyze the question to be determined
by the commissioners as one involving whether a refund to relator was
16. Weintraub, Mandamus and Certiorari in New York From the Revolution to 1880:
A Chapter in Legal History, 32 Fordbam L. Rev. 681, 703-05 (1964).
17. 149 N.Y. 26, 43 N.E. 418 (1896).
18. "When the law requires a public officer to do a specified act, in a specified way,

upon a conceded state of facts, without regard to his own judgment as to the propriety
of the act and with no power to exercise discretion, the duty is ministerial in character
and performance may be compelled by mandamus, if there is no other remedy." Id. at 31,
43 N.E. at 419.
19. Id. at 33, 43 N.E. at 419-20.
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to be approved, disregarding, however, the decision on the facts previously made by the state comptroller. The court ruled that in examining
and weighing the evidence and then making a determination, the defendants had acted in a judicial manner, i.e., "involving the exercise of
- It concluded by stating
judgment upon questions of both fact and law."20
that "even if their decision was clearly wrong some other remedy must
be adopted, for this writ [of mandamus] does not lie for the correction of
errors.' -1 The orders of special term7 and general term2-3 were reversed.
There is something to be said in behalf of the court's analysis of the
problem in the Harris case because some degree of judgment and discretion was necessary in the performance of the land commissioners'
duties in order to avoid payment of fraudulent claims. But the net effect
of the decision was to close the judicial doors completely to relief by
mandamus in all cases where the slightest degree of discretion could be
conjured to exist. The sole recourse which remained available to a suitor
was to attempt to secure review by certiorari. The courts, having by
decision enlarged the domain of official action considered to be judicial
in nature, thereby encouraged the belief that suitable review could be
secured by writ of certiorari. -4
Such was the procedure followed by a civil employee who had been
removed by a public official after having submitted his defense in writing
as authorized by law; in People ex rel. Kennedy v. Brady, the employee
brought certiorari to review his removal. The court of appeals dismissed
the suit and ruled that "official acts, executive, legislative, administrative
or ministerial in their nature or character, were never subject to review
by certiorari. .

.

. [which is] issued only for the purpose of reviewing

some judicial act."-" The court pointed out that "he [the relator] was not
entitled to be sworn or to introduce witnesses .... He was not en-

titled to a trial or a judicial hearing ....,,.In Kennedy v. Brady the court required the presence of additional
factors as a prerequisite for determining that an administrative body
has acted judicially where review by certiorari was sought. In addition
to the deciding of facts and the exercising of discretion by an administrative tribunal, in order to qualify as an act of a judicial nature, it vras
20. Id. at 32, 43 N.E. at 420.
21. Id. at 33, 43 N.E. at 420.
22. 12 ]ifsc. 223, 33 N.Y. Supp. 1102 (Sup. CL 1S95).
23. 90 Hun 525, 36 N.Y. Supp. 29 (3d Dep't 1895).
24. 149 N.Y. at 33, 43 N.E. at 420.
25.

166 N.Y. 44, 59 N.E. 701 (1901).

26. Id. at 47, 59 N.E. at 702.
27. Ibid.
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necessary that witnesses be sworn as in a judicial-type hearing or trial.2 8
Although these requirements appear reasonable and appropriate, the
court had nonetheless sanctioned common-law certiorari review in other
cases where auditors of local government bodies or local government
bodies acting as auditors, had rejected a claim. 9 In those situations, none
of the trappings of a trial-type proceeding was present but certiorari
review was granted without question and without benefit of statutory
authorization. In all likelihood, certiorari review was granted in such
instances, despite the absence of a trial-type proceeding, because of the
importance of the subject matter, and the absence of any other means of
judicial review. Further, by long tradition, and before the distinction
between certiorari and mandamus review was brought to a high degree
of refinement, such action on claims had been made subject to certiorari
review.
The confusion with regard to the mode of proceeding to secure judicial
review of administrative action was compounded by the holding in another leading case at about this time, People ex rel. Sims v. Collier.0 The
defendant State Civil Service Commission had adopted resolutions placing
relators in the competitive class of the civil service, and they brought
mandamus to have the positions restored to the exempt classification.
Access to certiorari relief having been extremely narrowed by the terms
of Kennedy v. Brady, the only available means of securing judicial review of this civil service question appeared to rest with mandamus, which
won the support of special term and the appellate division below.8 1
In the court of appeals, the difference between administrative action
reviewable by mandamus and by certiorari was again measured off32 and,
dismissing the action, the court concluded that "whether competitive examinations for appointment to particular places are practicable or not,
has been held to be a question of law, to be decided in the light of the
facts and the evidence bearing upon the subject."33 Apparently, in order
to avoid review of the particular administrative determination here, the
28. Ibid.
29.

See, e.g., People ex rel. McCabe v. Matthies, 179 N.Y. 242, 72 N.E. 103 (1904);

People ex rel. Myers v. Barnes, 114 N.Y. 317, 20 N.E. 609 (1889). See also People ex rel.
Central Park, No. & E.R.R.R. v. Willcox, 194 N.Y. 383, 87 N.E. 517 (1909).
30. 175 N.Y. 196, 67 N.E. 309 (1903). Review by mandamus was sanctioned by an
earlier decision of the court of appeals, People ex rel. Mack v. Burt, 170 N.Y. 620, 63 N.E.
1121 (1902) (memorandum decision), affirming 65 App. Div. 157, 72 N.Y. Supp. 567 (1st
Dep't 1901), where the use of certiorari to challenge a civil service classification was
rejected because such an administrative act was held not to be a judicial determination.
31. People ex rel. Letts v. Collier, 78 App. Div. 620, 79 N.Y. Supp. 671 (2d Dep't 1903).
32.

175 N.Y. at 201-02, 67 N.E. at 311-12.

33.

Id. at 204, 67 N.E. at 312.
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definition of what constituted judicial action was again modified to
include the mere exercise of judgment, thereby precluding consideration
of the merits of this action brought in mandamus. The trial-type requirements lately added to the concept of judicial action by administrative
bodies by the Kennedy v. Brady decision were totally ignored.
Although these fruitless efforts in search of a remedy failed to yield
definitive guidance as to the requisite conditions for securing judicial
review, there can be discerned a consistent disinclination by the court of
appeals, as distinguished from the lower courts, to get involved in reviewing administrative determinations involving the exercise of discretion. There is evident, also, a consistent purpose to keep mandamus
confined to its traditional, narrow function, i.e., merely to enforce action
of a purely ministerial, non-discretionary nature. In certiorari, if the
statute authorized certiorari review, or if the circumstances upon which
the relator's claim were pegged could be made to fit the undulating ring
of what the court on that particular occasion considered to be judicial
action, the broader scope of review authorized by the Code of Civil
Procedure was at the disposal of the fortunate relator.3
How inordinately difficult it was to peg the ring for certiorari review is
exemplified by a case which was closely patterned upon the facts of
Sims v. Collier. Acting upon the categorical advice handed down in the
latter case, on facts which were closely analogous, certiorari was brought,
in People e.- rel. Schau v. McT1illians,'1 to review and to set aside the
action of the State Civil Service Commission, which had changed the
classification of relator's position as Battalion Chief in the Buffalo Fire
Department from exempt to competitive. As in Sims v. Collier, the appellate division had followed current precedent and sustained the certiorari (in Sims v. Collier the appellate division approved mandamus) on
the ground that competitive examination for the position was not practicable.3 6
At the outset of the court of appeals decision, the now-familiar technique of exhaustively defining the nature of judicial action taken by an
administrative body was followed in order to determine whether certiorari review should be granted in the instant case. It was made clear that
"the fact that public officers or agents exercise judgment and discretion
in the performance of their duties does not make their action judicial
in character so as to subject it to review by certiorariY3 7 Here was the
34. N.Y. Sess. Laws ISSO, ch. 16, § 2140.
35. 185 N.Y. 92, 77 N.E. 7S5 (1906).
36. People ex rel. Schau v. Whittet, 100 App. Div. 176, 91 N.Y. Supp. 675 (4th Dcp't

1905).
37.

185 N.Y. at 96, 77 N.E. at 7S6.
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hint, in the opening passages of the opinion, which foreshadowed that the
newly evolved rule of Sims v. Collier was slated for revision. The court
then proceeded to elaborate why a complete turnabout from the latter
decision was required, explaining that
if the action of the civil service commission is to be reviewed by certiorari, there
seems to be no escape from the conclusion that ultimately the classification of every

officer or employee in the service of the state, or its political subdivisions, must be
determined by this court .. . . It would cast upon the courts a burden which would
not only be difficult for them to bear, but which they are by no means the officers
best qualified to discharge. . . . [P]roper classification . . . [is related to] practical
operation[s]38

It was evident that the newly acquired jurisdiction to review administrative determinations of civil service commissioners in classifying positions had to be declined because it was too burdensome, and the recently
created rule of Sims v. Collier was accordingly disavowed in its very
infancy. The hapless suitor was again cast adrift in unchartered waters
where, if he sailed into the port of mandamus, he was enjoined to try
certiorari and vice versa. What may sound like a parable, but is not,
describes precisely what happened to the unsuccessful relators in Kennedy v. Brady, Sims v. Collier and Schau v. McWilliams when their cases
reached the court of appeals.
Apparently aware of the unjust consequences of this sequence of lawsuits, the court observed that the relator's failure to secure relief by
certiorari did not place his situation beyond all remedy. For "if the
position be by statute or from its nature exempt from examination and
the action of the commission be palpably illegal, the commission may be
compelled to strike the position from the competitive or examination
class," but this ray of hope is immediately tempered with the qualification that if "there is fair and reasonable ground for difference of opinion
among intelligent and conscientious officials, the action of the commission
should stand, even though the courts may differ from the commission as
to the wisdom of the classification. The present case is of this character." 40
The court closes its opinion by openly acknowledging that it erred in Sims
v. Collier because it did not realize to what extent it would be flooded with
certiorari actions as a result of the broad sweep of that decision.4 The
order of the appellate division was reversed and the writ of certiorari
was quashed.
38. Id. at 98-99, 77 N.E. at 787; d. Lemir Realty Corp. v. Larkin, 11 N.Y.2d 20, 24,
181 N.E.2d 407, 409, 226 N.Y.S.2d 374, 376 (1962), to the same effect in regard to Judicial
review of the actions of "hundreds of .

.

. zoning boards in this State."

39. 185 N.Y. at 99, 77 N.E. at 787.
40. Ibid.
41. Id. at 101, 77 N.E. at 787-88. See also Simons v. McGuire, 204 N.Y. 253, 9Y N.E. 526
(1912), where the court criticized Sims v. Collier.
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Thenceforth, unless a clear-cut question of law was presented for its
determination,' it was highly unlikely that the court of appeals would
undertake review and intrude itself into matters of administration. If
this analysis is correct, then the stand taken by the court of appeals did
not represent a radical departure from the judicial attitude which had
prevailed during the preceding century of judicial review. The scope
of mandamus review up to that time had remained static and unchanged,
charged only with requiring mere ministerial action. The ad hoc interpretations placed upon the varied activities of administrative bodies by the
court, which in the main tended to attribute a judicial quality to administrative action brought up for review, tended to exclude or at least
curtail any consideration of such activities in a mandamus action. At the
same time, unless a trial-type hearing was prescribed by statute or a
statute specifically authorized certiorari or certiorari had become a traditional mode of judicial review, a suitor had small chance to secure judicial
review of an administrative determination by writ of certiorari.
However, the recital of the failures in the foregoing cases should not
be construed as an effort to project a study in futility. Nor is it intended
to serve as partial documentation for the statutory changes which eventually were effected by the adoption of article 78 in 1937:3 This phase
of judicial history is singularly instructive for the manner in which
judicial review of administrative action involving discretion of a nonjudicial nature was choked off in almost all directions, with the result
that some alternative remedy had to be improvised for meeting an obvious
need. At this critical juncture, the common law demonstrated another
revealing example of its capacity to infuse a well-established legal form
with new concepts where existing remedies had failed to respond to urgent
needs."
Paradoxically, this responsibility fell to mandamus, which had heretofore been blocked off from any involvement with questions of judgment
and discretion. In fact, the original and essential purpose of mandamus
was antithetical to dealing with a situation where the flux and flexibility
of judgment and discretion existed. However, the niceties of logic and of
historical usage did not prevent mandamus from being drafted for the
need of the moment; logic has invariably yielded to the "felt necessities
of the time."'
Although Schau v. McWilliams arrested the development of certiorari
as a writ to review administrative action involving the exercise of judg42.

185 N.Y. at 101, 77 N.E. at 787.

43. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 526, §§ 1283-1306.
44. Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review by Prerogative Writ: Certiorari and
Mandamus, 9 N.Y.L.F. 478, SOS n.140 (1963).
45. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (18S7).
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ment or discretion, the case nevertheless imparted the impetus for diverting mandamus to that purpose. It is to be recalled that the opinion adverted to the possible extreme case where the action of a civil service
commission was conceivably "palpably illegal," and, as a dictum, the
court added that mandamus would be available to strike down such
action. However, it immediately added the caveat that mere difference
of opinion between courts and officials as to the wisdom of an administrative action, so long as it was fair and reasonable, could not justify judicial
interference.46 Although couched in negative terms, the groundwork had
been laid to bring administrative judgment or discretion of a nonjudicial nature under the mantle of judicial review.
The following year, 1907, presented a case, People ex rel. Lodes v.
Department of Health,4 7 where the random seed cast by the Schau v.
McWilliams opinion acquired an additional cubit of growth, although
here discretion was not the chief point in issue on the appeal. Lodes is
another example whereby a major rule of law commences its existence in
the form of dicta in a case concerned with other matters. Lodes, a milk
distributor in New York City, vending his products from a store and by
delivery wagons, had his milk permits revoked on the ground that he,
his wife and his drivers had been convicted four times of selling adulterated milk. At special term4" and in the appellate division 49 he was granted
a peremptory mandamus on the ground that he was entitled to notice
and hearing before such revocation was effected.
In the court of appeals it was held that the conduct of a milk business,
like that of a liquor business, affecting as it does the public health, welfare
and morals, allows the police power of the state to summarily revoke
relator's permit without prior notice and hearing. The court also noted
that the statute governing the board of health made no provision for a
hearing and neither was there such a requirement in the general statutes.
The court cited the decision in Schau v. McWilliams to point out that the
board of health exercised administrative powers as distinguished from
judicial powers, and for that additional reason it may proceed against
a party without notice. "If, however, their action is arbitrary, tyrannical
and unreasonable, or is based upon false information, the relator may
have a remedy through mandamus to right the wrong which he has
suffered."" °
Here was a stray sentence, clothing an amorphous concept, which would
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

185 N.Y. at 99, 77 N.E. at 787 (1906),
189 N.Y. 187, 82 N.E. 187 (1907).
51 Misc. 190, 100 N.Y. Supp. 788 (Sup. Ct. 1906).
116 App. Div. 890, 102 N.Y. Supp. 1145 (2d Dep't 1907).
189 N.Y. at 194, 82 N.E. at 189.
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eventually be transformed into a governing principle of law. In the Lodes
case the principle was applied to the limited extent that, although the
peremptory mandamus granted to relator below was reversed by the court
of appeals, he was given leave to apply for alternative mandamus to
enable him to prove that the revocation of his milk license was unwarranted by the facts and should, therefore, be set aside.
Invoking a mere suggestion made in Schap v. McWilliams, the court
here enlarged the boundaries of mandamus to encompass judicial review
as a remedy for testing the validity of the action of the board of health
on a question of judgment and discretion, i.e., whether the facts showed
that relator was or was not "a fit and proper person to engage in the sale
and distribution of milk ...." If relator prevailed, he was entitled to be
granted a peremptory mandamus directing the return of his milk per51
mits.
The theory tentatively postulated in Lodes was consolidated by another
decision of the court of appeals made later that year, 197.2 Thus, in
short order, the rule of absolute administrative discretion was virtually
overthrown, and the right to obtain judicial review of administrative
action involving the exercise of judgment or discretion of a non-judicial
nature became clearly established in a broader sphere of action. In
the latter case, People ex rel. Empire City Trotting Club v. State Racing
Comm'n,3 relator had been denied a license by respondent to conduct
horse racing in the New York City area on the ground that the racing
season dates had already been allocated to six other race tracks in that
area. The relator was awarded a peremptory mandamus in the appellate
division,5" but the court of appeals took special pains to formulate its
opinion in terms of the issues arising from the exercise of broad, discretionary power by respondent racing commission. The court observed
that although mandamus did not normally lie to compel performance of
a duty which involved the exercise of discretion, it now carved out the
corollary requirement "that the action of the officer must not be capricious
or arbitrary, and if such be the character of the reasons for refusing to
act the writ will lie."" As authority for this proposition the court cited,
among others, Schau v. McWiliams, and also quoted a portion of the
Lodes opinion which has been set forth above 5
51. Ibid.
52. People ex rel. Empire City Trotting Club v. State Racing Comm'n, 190 N.Y. 31,
82 N.E. 723 (1907) (per curiam).
53. 190 N.Y. 31, 82 N.E. 723 (1907) (per curiam).
54. 120 App. Div. 484, 105 N.Y. Supp. 528 (2d Dep't 1907).
55. 190 N.Y. at 33-34, S2 N.E. at 723.
56. Id. at 34, S2 N.E. at 723; see note 50 supra and accompanying text.
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The court considered the reason offered by respondent that the allotment of non-competitive racing dates is part of the proper regulation of
racing, and that if relator's request were granted it would interfere with
the racing conducted at other race tracks in the area. This line of reasoning was rejected. The court determined that the object of the statute
investing regulatory power in the racing commission was to insure that
horse racing in the state would be properly and honestly conducted, not
to regulate or prevent competition between individual racing groups.
The statute was silent with regard to the allocation of racing dates, and
the assumption of respondent that it was confided with power to regulate
competition was "in point of law ... capricious and arbitrary. M-7
This decision clarified much that was left unsaid in Shau v. McWilliams
and in Lodes. It made plain that the exercise of discretion by a governmental body was subject to review even if the action were of a non-judicial
nature. Where the action taken was not within the range of choice legally
available to the administrative body, the duty to act upon a legal basis
in such matters of discretion would be enforced by the issuance of a writ
of mandamus. The broad, discretionary power given to the racing commission did not blind the court to the fact that the exercise of such administrative power may sometimes be honestly misdirected or misconceived. Although the racing commission offered a plausible reason for the
rejection of relator's request, the court, doing that which it was most
qualified to do, examined the relevant statute to ascertain the purpose
of the legislation and thereby established limits to respondent's discretion. It was thereby enabled to determine that the proffered reason was
irrelevant to the purpose of the racing statute and, therefore, as a matter
of law, arbitrary and capricious. This conclusion required that the
determination of the racing commission be set aside.
Although the judiciary in New York had always demonstrated a deference to administrative judgment and had incorporated this attitude into
the rule that mandamus would not lie to review the exercise of judgment
or discretion, it now recognized that the logical extension of that rule
would permit administrative bodies to operate without the control of law,
or even in disregard of law. The "arbitrary and capricious" rule was
accordingly evolved to accommodate a need for some legal oversight of
administrative action involving discretion or judgment, but the court
retained the salutary limitation expressed in Schau v. McWilliams that
where
there is fair and reasonable ground for difference of opinion among intelligent and
conscientious officials, the action of the commission should stand, even though the
courts may differ from the commission as to the wisdom of the classification, 5 8
57. 190 N.Y. at 35, 82 N.E. at 724.
58. 185 N.Y. at 99, 77 N.E. at 787. In a subsequent case involving establishment of a
25-year age limitation for admission to a fire inspector's examination, the court of appeals
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Although the terminology employed by the courts in disposing of
questions similar to that considered in the foregoing cases has been modified in minor respects, the substance and the sense of the Schan pro-

nouncement has remained the guiding rule upon judicial review. This
means, also, that a practical distinction between administrative discretion

exercised in establishment of rules and administrative discretion exercised
in adjudication (of a non-statutory nature) has not been developed by

judicial decision applying the "arbitrary-capricious-unreasonable" yardstick. It would appear that, as a delegate of legislative power, administra-

tive action of the former type would be entitled to greater latitude than
administrative adjudication, but judicial opinions neglected to draw any
significant distinctions between them!"

Despite the clear ring of the Empire City Trotting Club opinion, laying it down as a rule that the exercise of administrative discretion was

to be governed by a rule of law expressed in terms of "arbitrary and
capricious" action, and embodied in the foregoing test of reasonableness,

the hold of long habit and precedent was not easily discarded. In Peopk
ex rel. New York & Queens County Gas Co. v. McCall," a crucial test
arose as the result of an order made by the Public Service Commission of
New York which directed a public utility to extend its gas lines to provide

service to a new area in Queens County. A sizeable expenditure was
involved. Disregarding, however, the rationale of the holdings in Schau,

Lodes and Empire City Trotting Club, the appellate division formulated
its own estimate of the desirability of the prescribed extension, and it

concluded that the PSC order should be set aside. Although the order
was nominally reviewed by certiorari, in essence, it concerned questions

of discretion and judgment, and was not a determination involving
illegality, jurisdiction, statutory interpretation and application, or the
stated: "In the absence of some express limitation the action of the commission in Bxing
such tests must stand, unless it is so clearly irrelevant and unreasonable as to be palpably
indefensible and improper. If any fair, reasonable argument may be made to custain the
action the courts should not interfere, even though they may differ from the commiLion as
to its advisability." People ex reL Moriarty v. Creelman, 206 N.Y. 570, 576, 100 N.E. 446,
448 (1912). The foregoing quotations from Schau v. AcWrilliams and Moriarty v. Creelman
admirably summarize the meaning to be attributed to "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable," from both the negative and positive standpoints.
59. See People ex rel. Republican & Journal Co. v. Wiggins, 199 N.Y. 3M2, 335, 92 NX.
789, 790 (1910), for perceptive comment on the problem and "difficulty of applying logical
and practical distinctions to the many forms of official action which lie between those that
are essentially and clearly judicial, and others that are as distinctly legislative, administrative or ministerial; a difficulty which is constantly being augmented by the modern tendency
of legislatures to delegate all kinds of governmental action to various boards and commissions"
60. 171 App. Div. 580, 157 N.Y. Supp. 707 (1st Dep't), rev'd, 219 N.Y. 84, 113 N.E.
795 (1916), alt'd, 245 U.S. 345 (1917).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

weight or competency of evidence as contemplated by section 2140 of
the Code of Civil Procedure for certiorari review."' Orders of the PSC
were made reviewable by certiorari pursuant to statute because of the
importance of the matters involved and the size of the financial stakes,
and not because trial-type hearings were held. The PSC order in McCall
became the testing ground of the viability of the newly developed rule
of reasonableness.
In reversing, the court of appeals delivered a spirited defense of the
functions performed by administrative bodies "dealing with the complex
problems presented by the activities of these great corporations."0 "
Without specifically acknowledging its antecedents, the court reiterated
a vital principle from Schau v. McWilliams in pointing out that the
appellate division did not have the power to examine the PSC order from
the standpoint of whether it was wise or expedient, "but only that it was
unreasonable if it was an unlawful, arbitrary or capricious exercise of
power."0 3 This is language borrowed directly from the holdings in the
Lodes and Empire City Trotting Club cases. A decision of the United
States Supreme Court was quoted to clarify the single issue actually
presented for judicial determination in this particular case: "'Power
to make the order and not the mere expediency or wisdom of having
made it, is the question.' ,,"4

Although the administrative determination was sustained in McCall,
the larger principle that administrative discretion was subject to judicial
review received strong endorsement from the importance of the subject
matter of the action, the distinction expounded by the court of appeals
between reviewing the exercise of power and reviewing the exercise of
discretion, and the fact that the result had been sustained upon Supreme
Court review. The court of appeals strengthened the hand of administrative bodies upon judicial review by emphasizing that it was not the
"rightness" but the "reasonableness" of the commission's actions which
the courts were called upon to examine. The action taken by the administrative body, the court indicated, was to be sustained if it could conceivably be considered as a rational method of tackling the problem at
61. People ex rel. Central Park, No. & E.R.R.R. v. Willcox, 194 N.Y. 383, 87 N.E. 517
(1909). See 1 Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York 344-46
(1942).
62. People ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 219 N.Y. 84, 88, 113
N.E. 795, 796 (1916), aff'd, 245 U.S. 345 (1917).
63. 219 N.Y. at 89, 113 N.E. at 796.
64. Id. at 88-89, 113 N.E. at 796, quoting ICC v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 215 U.S. 452, 470
(1910). In adapting the quoted statement to the case at hand, the court of appeals was
emphasizing the limited, classical function of certiorari to review the question of jurisdiction alone. See Weintraub, supra note 16, at 721.
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hand, notwithstanding any difference of opinion which the reviewing court
might harbor in regard thereto. 5 This attitude marked no new departure
in the law by the judicial branch, except for the more explicit sanction
which McCall gave to administrative action based upon a reasonable
premise. But it was also stated that administrative discretion was reversible if it was exercised in an illegal manner so that it fell afoul of the
"arbitrary-capricious-unreasonable" requirement."
Illegality, as a term for defining unreasonable action, presents an attractive simplicity, standing by itself. Clothed, as it must be, with the
paraphernalia of administrative action, and exercised in a factual context
pursuant to statutory authority which ostensibly sanctions the action
taken, it is somewhat less than easy to isolate the point of departure
from legality. For example, in the City of New York broad powers
were available under the city charter to control the activities of junk
dealers. 7 The Commissioner of Licenses was authorized by city ordinance
to require junk dealers to submit applications on forms prescribed by
him, to pay a fee and be bonded, and to impose further requirements
as authorized by the ordinance; the term "junk dealer" included a person
operating a junk boat in the harbor of the city.1
A party who had operated a junk boat for several years submitted
an application to the license commissioner to operate a junk boat. The
commissioner denied the license because the applicant did not have a
junk shop license and a place of business for that purpose, and also
because there was neither room nor need for further junk boat licenses6P
Upon this, a mandamus was sought by the applicant, in Picone v. Comwissioner of Licenses,7 to compel issuance of a junk boat license to
him, alleging that the action of the commissioner was "arbitrary, tyrannical and unreasonable" insofar as the reasons assigned for the denial
of the license were concerned.7 ' The commissioner defended his action
as a proper exercise of discretion because of the many complaints of
theft committed in the city harbor which were alleged to emanate from
junk boats, and because more than one hundred such licenses were outstanding. The commissioner further added his opinion that it was a
mistake to grant such licenses altogether.7 -"
65. 219 N.Y. at 91, 113 N.E. at 797.
66. Id. at 90, 91, 113 N.E. at 797.
67. N.Y.C. Charter § 51 (now N.Y.C. Charter § 436).
6S. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § B32-113.0(4).
69. Picone v. Commissioner of Licenses, 214 App. Div. 724, 209 N.Y. Supp. 904 (2d Dep't)
(memorandum decision), rev'd, 241 N.Y. 157, 149 N.E. 336 (1925).
70. 241 N.Y. 157, 149 N.E. 336 (1925).
71. Id. at 160, 149 N.E. at 337.
72. Ibid. See also Sausser v. Department of Health, 242 N.Y. 66, 150 N.E. C03 (1926).
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Of course, the commissioner did not help his case by offering his personal views as to the desirability of issuing junk boat licenses, however
much he is to be commended for his candor. The local ordinance provided
for the issuance of such licenses and there was no provision therein
limiting the number of junk boats to be licensed. 73 This led the court
to rule that a licensing officer may not arbitrarily impose numerical limitations not contained in the licensing statute. Although the court termed
the commissioner's action an "abuse of discretion," found for the relator
on all other disputed points and directed that a license issue to him, it
added a notable statement of the limitations upon the exercise of discretion which has now become familiar: "Laws are made by the law-making
power and not by administrative officers acting solely on their own ideas
of sound public policy, however excellent such ideas may be.""4 This
statement is not unlike the criticism of the State Racing Commisssion
delivered in the Empire City Trotting Club case where the commission
sought to regulate the economics of horse racing by allocating noncompetitive dates.7 5 It was ruled ultra vires there, just as the license
commissioner's private views on the desirability of allowing junk boats to
operate in New York harbor were overruled in the Picone case.
The exercise of licensing power within a context of general authority
to regulate an activity has continued to trouble the courts, if "trouble"
may be construed as the reflex description of sharp divisions within the
court of appeals, and between the appellate division and the court of
appeals where the exercise of broad licensing powers has been litigated.
In two cases of more recent vintage, the extent of the powers confided to
the discretion of the License Commissioner of the City of New York
were again brought into sharp focus.
In the first of these cases, Bologno v. O'Connell, the lower court,
whose order was affirmed by the appellate division,7" had granted an
application made by petitioner for an order directing the commissioner to
issue a junk shop license to him. The commissioner's ground of denial
was that the junk shop was to be located in an area of vacant land which
was in a predominately residential district. The court of appeals formulated the sole issue on appeal to be whether such an administrative
77
limitation was "within the ambit of legislatively delegated discretion.1
73. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § B32-113.0(4).
74. 241 N.Y. at 162, 149 N.E. at 338. For a strikingly similar judicial criticism, sceo
People ex rel. Osterhout v. Perry, 13 Barb. 206, 209 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852). See also Small
v. Moss, 279 N.Y. 288, 299, 18 N.E.2d 281, 285 (1938); People ex rel. Cosby v. Robinson,
114 App. Div. 656, 126 N.Y. Supp. 546 (1st Dep't 1910).
75. See notes 56 & 57 supra and accompanying text,
76. 7 App. Div. 2d 749, 181 N.Y.S.2d 765 (2d Dep't 1958) (memorandum decision),
aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 155, 164 N.E.2d 389, 196 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1959).
77. 7 N.Y.2d 155, 158, 164 N.E.2d 389, 390, 196 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (1959).
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As in Picone, the numerous conditions and restrictions relevant to the
business of conducting a junk shop were noted. The court conceded that
any effort to lay out the bounds of the commissioner's area of discretion
in meticulous detail would frustrate his chances to cope with the myriad
circumstances which could conceivably arise. Moreover, the court stated
that it is not necessary, in license legislation, to "'prescribe a specific
rule of action.' ,,7S
Nevertheless, "administrative discyetion must be guided by an express
or clearly implied standard, policy or purpose."19 Under well-established
principles of administrative law, once this field of discretion is ascertained, the court will not "interfere with a reasonable determination
[made] within this sphere of discretion .... 1
In order to determine whether the field of the commissioner's discretion
encompassed the protection of the residential nature of the area from
intrusion by a junk shop, the court had recourse to the history and purpose
of junk shop regulation. It discovered that the legislation was grounded
primarily on the prevention of the distribution of stolen goods~sI The fact
that, under the New York City Charter, the City Planning Commission
had full responsibility for planning and safeguarding the proper uses of
land in the city was cited as additional evidence that a general power to
control the locale of a junk shop was not intended to be confided to the
license commissioner. Other legal uses in the area allowed fertilizer
manufacturing, a crematory and a slaughter house, further negating a
need for power by the commissioner to control the location of a junk shop
in that area.s2
Although the commissioner was armed with a broad discretion to cope
with problems arising in the field of activity assigned to him, he nonetheless did not possess a general and unlimited discretion in regard to junk
shops and their operation.-" Where the ground of denial of a junk shop
license rested on a matter or matters lying outside his sphere of
responsibility and authority, denial of a license was equivalent to an
arbitrary exercise of power. Liberal as the courts have been in recognizing
the arsenal of power which a licensing agency requires in order to meet
variegated and unforeseen conditions in its special sphere of activity, the
agency cannot arrogate powers to itself which are unrelated to the
administration of its functional responsibilities. When it relies upon such
78. Id. at 159, 164 N.E.2d at 391, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 93, quoting Marburg v. Cole, 286
N.Y. 202, 212, 36 N.E.2d 113, 117 (1941).
79. 7 N.Y.2d at 159, 164 N.E.2d at 391, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
So. Ibid; Small v. Moss, 277 N.Y. 501, 507, 14 N.E.2d E0, 310 (1933).
81. 7 N.Y.2d at 159-60, 164 N.E.2d at 391-92, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
82. Id. at 160, 164 N.E.2d at 392, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
83. Id. at 158, 164 N.E.2d at 391, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
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arrogated power, the agency leaves the precincts of relevancy to its
functions and the action becomes an arbitrary and illegal assumption of
power never intended to be conferred by the legislature. In Bologno the
dissent rightly pointed out, however, that the majority opinion was itself
in conflict with a recent holding of the court where the residential
character of an area was accepted as a basis for denying a bowling alley
license, albeit specific authorization in the statute for allowing the license
commissioner to consider this factor was absent. 4
The holding in Bologno can best be summarized by stating that the
"locale" of a junk shop is not integrally related to the functions confided
to the license commissioner and, therefore, was not intended to be a
matter over which he was implicitly given jurisdiction to exercise his
discretion. In Rosenberg v. Moss,"5 cited in the Bologno dissent,80 the
establishment of a bowling alley would have tended to bring large numbers of strangers to the area. Such an invasion of a private, residential
area may be considered an ancillary problem, emanating from the issuance of a bowling alley license, and consequently to lie within the ambit
of the commissioner's responsibility and authority. At best, however,
the question is a close one, demonstrating that general licensing powers
function within a trackless area which can never be wholly mapped out
in advance by legislative definition or by piecemeal judicial decision
after the act.
In a case companion to Bologno, Barton Trucking Corp. v. O'Connell,8 7
the field of the license commissioner's power and discretion was again
exposed to close scrutiny. This case is noteworthy for the comprehensive
opinions written in all of the reviewing courts, viz., special term, the
appellate division and the court of appeals.
A license as a public cartman, i.e., a trucking license to operate within
the City of New York, had been denied to the petitioner corporation by
the Commissioner of Licenses on the ground that the corporation treasurer had been convicted of extortion in 1937 in connection with garment
trucking racketeering. The trucking activities to be licensed here were
intended to be carried on in the garment district of New York. Special
term was of the belief that implicit in the licensing setup was the necessary
requirement that the applicant be a "fit and proper person" to engage
84. Id. at 164, 164 N.E.2d at 394, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 97 (dissenting opinion), citing
Rosenberg v. Moss, 296 N.Y. 595, 68 N.E.2d 880 (1946) (memorandum decision) ; cf. People
ex rel. Sprenger v. Department of Health, 226 N.Y. 209, 123 N.E. 379 (1919) (per curiam).
85. 296 N.Y. 595, 68 N.E.2d 880 (1946) (memorandum decision).
86. 7 N.Y.2d at 164, 164 N.E.2d at 394, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 97 (dissenting opinion).
87. 7 N.Y.2d 299, 165 N.E.2d 163, 197 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1959).
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in the business; it therefore sustained the action of the commissioner as
"sound and salutary" in view of the criminal record aforesaid.P
In reversing, the unanimous appellate division ruled that the commissioner was without power to deny the license on this ground because the
bare statute was entirely silent regarding such qualifications for public
cartmen." In addition, the absence of any standards in the statute to
guide the commissioner in exercising such an assumed discretion as to
a prior criminal record was also fatal to the administrative determination
here. The court conceded that a license may be denied even where
standards are not clearly spelled out if the use of the license would
violate the law or would infringe upon public policy. The spare provisions of this statute did not tend to sustain the comnmissioner's action on
either of these special exceptions to the rule requiring specific standards
to support the denial herein, although a remand was ordered to allow
further proof to be adduced in this respect ° The appellate division
regarded the purpose of the licensing here of public cartmen to be confined to identification, collection of revenue and control over fees charged
to the public.91 Therefore, the commissioner had no power to impose
a requirement and exercise a discretion in regard to character qualifications.
Relying in large part upon a much-cited and oft-quoted nineteenth
century case, People ex rel. Schwab v. Grant," the court of appeals
ruled, in reversing on appeal, that standards need not be expressly spelled
out where power is delegated to an administrative body if such power
is implicitly delegated in light of the statutory purposeP3 Entering upon
a search for this statutory purpose, the opinion cited the general licensing
provisions of the New York City Charter, 4 the provisions of the old
Brooklyn City Charter relating to public cartmen,13 and to City of Brooklyn v. Breslin," a case decided thereunder27 The court also considered the
Piconecase and several other licensing cases where a statutory implication
was discerned that a license could be denied to a person who was found
not to be fit and proper s In further support of the action of the com88.
S9.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

10 Mlisc. 2d 717, 718, 173 N.Y.S.2d 464, 466 (Sup. Ct. 195S).
7 App. Div. 2d 36, 3S, ISO N.Y.S.2d 6&6, 6S9 (Ist Dep't 1953).
Id. at 42, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
Id. at 40, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
126 N.Y. 473, 27 N.E. 964 (1891).
7 NX.2d 299, 307, 165 N.E.2d 163, 166-67, 197 N.YS.2d 138, 143 (1959).
Id. at 307-08, 165 N.E.2d at 167, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
Id. at 311-12, 165 N.E.2d at 169, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
57 N.Y. 591 (1874).
7 N.Y.2d at 311-12, 165 N.E.2d at 169, 197 N.YS.2d at 147.
Id. at 309-10, 165 N.E.2d at 16S, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 145-46, ciring Da Staio v.
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missioner, another well-cited case, Larkin Co. v. Schwab," was enlisted
to show that judicial interference is justified "only when it is clearly
shown that refusal is based solely upon grounds which as matter of law
may not control . . . [his] discretion .... Moo Actually, this quotation
begged the question at issue because it did not set limits upon the area of
discretion or expound a guiding concept for ascertaining the elements
which the commissioner can properly consider in discharging his responsibilities effectively and in the best public interest. In sum, a rule for evaluating the validity of administrative action based upon considerations of
character was not spelled out in the statute, and such guidance was needed
to determine the validity of the action taken in the Barton case.
Concluding, however, that the character of an applicant for a license
to conduct a public carting business was a proper subject of administrative concern and inquiry, the court readily disposed of the two remaining
questions raised in the adverse decision of the appellate division. Marburg v. Cole' was cited to obviate the need for " 'definite, comprehensive'" standards, and, therefore, the nature and locale of this conviction
precluded "as a matter of law that the Commissioner acted arbitrarily
or capriciously in refusing to issue the licenses."' °2 Evidently, the court
was quite sensitive to the importance of Schwab v. Grant,103 for it is
quoted from towards the end of the Barton decision as follows:
In the government of the affairs of a great municipality many powers must necessarily
be confided to the discretion of its administrative officers, and it can be productive
only of mischief in the treatment of such questions to substitute the discretion of
strangers to the power in place of that of the officers best acquainted with the neces10 4
sities of the case and to whom the legislature has specially confided their exercise,

The foregoing quotation supplied the rationale for the decision in the
Barton case, and of other decisions where the exercise of broad discretion
Fielding, 295 N.Y. 903, 68 N.E.2d 23 (1946) (memorandum decision); Arroyo v. Moss,
295 N.Y. 754, 65 N.E.2d 570 (1946) (memorandum decision).
99. 242 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926).
100. Id. at 335, 151 N.E. at 639.
101. 286 N.Y. 202, 36 N.E.2d 113 (1941).
102. 7 N.Y.2d at 312, 313, 165 N.E.2d at 170, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 148, 149. But see Clcdo
v. O'Connell, 17 App. Div. 2d 771, 232 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1st Dep't 1962) (memorandum decision), where petitioner's convictions in 1932 for petty larceny and attempted forgery were
cited by the license commissioner to preclude his securing a keymaker's license needtd for his
job as chief engineer in a hotel. The court ruled that although the prior convictions were
somewhat relevant, they were too remote in time-over thirty years with an unblemished
record-to constitute a valid basis for the denial of the license.
103. 126 N.Y. 473, 27 N.E. 964 (1891).
104. 7 N.Y.2d at 314, 165 N.E.2d at 171, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 150, quoting from 126 N.Y.
at 482, 27 N.E. at 967.
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by an administrative official had been sustained by the courts in the
name of a definite legislative purpose, but which actually lacked the
specifics of statutory authorization.0 0 Once the proposition is framed in
the terms set forth in Schwab v. Grant, the precise issues of power,
authority and discretion tend to become blurred and the impact of
judicial review is softened as generalized case law principles are invoked
by copious quotation to support the decision of the court.
However, a further word needs to be said about the heavy reliance
placed upon People ex rel. Sclwab v. Grant. In that case the relator's
bond and license to act as an auctioneer were disapproved by the Mayor
of the City of New York. The court of appeals fell back upon legislative
history and the exercise of police powers to support the authority for
licensing auctioneers, and wielded the concept of such a license as a
"privilege" to ward off relator's argument that he had a "right" to a
license.', The court buttressed this stand with the statement that
No one, we think, could reasonably claim that the exercise of the discretion of the
mayor with respect to the subject of granting such licenses, could be subjected to
supervision or control. . . .The practice of nearly a century in this
state has taught
0
T
us that there is little to fear from an abuse of this power ....
105. E.g., Playboy Club, Inc. v. O'Connell, IS App. Div. 2d 339, 239 N.YS.2d 262
(lst Dep't 1963), aff'd mem. 14 N.Y.2d 503, 197 N.E.2d 622, 243 N.Y.S.2d 226 remittitur
amended mem. 14 N.Y.2d 64S, 193 N.E.2d 602, 249 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964), where the
License Commissioner of the City of New York was upheld in denying a cabaret liceme
to petitioner under statutory standards requiring an applicant to be "a fit and proper
person" and the premises to be a "safe and proper place ... ." 13 App. Div. 2d at 341,
239 N.Y.S.2d at 265. But see Playboy Club, Inc. v. Hostetter, 19 App. Div. 2d 822,
243 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1st Dep't 1963) (memorandum deision), affd mem. 14 N..2d
933, 200 N.E.2d 86S, 252 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1964), where the court found, upon petitioner's
application for a liquor license, an absence of relevancy bet-en a one-time "hey" or
admission charge and respondent's general statutory responsibility for promoting conditions
favorable to temperance and, therefore, directed issuance of the license.
106. 126 N.Y. at 431-82, 27 N.E. at 967. The use of the concept of "prviege" as a
measuring rod upon judicial review still persists. See Fink v. Cole, 1 N.Y.2d 43, 133 N.E.2d
691, 150 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1956) (horse racing license). For the distinction between the cl:=ification of several types of interests, see Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d
421 (1954).
107. 126 N.Y. at 432, 27 N.E. at 967. The rule of absolute discretion framed in Schwab
v. Grant has become progressively narrowed with the passage of years. In large measure,
Schau, Lodes and Empire City Trotting Club were primarily responsible for the change.
At present, small pockets of administrative activity remain impervious to judicial scrutiny.
Hines v. State Bd. of Parole, 293 N.Y. 254, 56 N.E.2d 572 (1944); Berger v. Walsh, 291
N.Y. 220, 52 N.E.2d 105 (1943); Sheridan v. McElligott, 278 N.Y. 59, 15 N.E.2d 393
(1933); Bullock v. Cooley, 225 N.Y. 566, 122 N.E. 630 (1919). But see Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 6 N.Y.2d 127, 160 N.E.2d 60, 1S N.Y.S.2d 515 (1959); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v.
Bohlinger, 30S N.Y. 174, 124 N.E.2d 110 (1954).
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The judicial attitude which is reflected in the foregoing quotation was
the accepted and established rule at the turn of the nineteenth century
in regard to judicial review of administrative discretion by mandamus;
there was no judicial review possible. The court itself acknowledged:
"Whether any remedy is afforded by the law for an abuse of such discretion it is not now necessary to inquire, as that question cannot be
presented on an application for a mandamus."' 1 8 When the additional
fact is added that no reason was offered by the mayor at any point for
refusing to issue the license, the luster of the otherwise incisive language
in the opinion is dulled insofar as useful guidance in connection with
contemporary judicial review is concerned. The holding represents an
accurate statement of the law of its time, but the rationale became
outmoded more than fifty years ago. Therefore, the use of its terminology
for present-day authority is ill advised because the concept behind the
earlier holding bears no resemblance to contemporary concepts of administrative law in the area of review of discretion. The residual value
of Schwab v. Grant is now largely historical.
Barton is instructive also for the light it throws on the changed judicial
attitude regarding the need for spelling out standards in legislation as
a necessary condition to the valid exercise of administrative discretion
under a general grant of power. As noted above, Barton utilized Marburg
v. Cole"°9 to supersede Small v. Moss" ° and Seignious v. Rice,"' and
thereby whittled down former judicial insistence upon specific legislative
standards as a condition to the valid delegation of power to exercise
administrative discretion. Henceforth, according to Barton, legislative
standards need not be explicit but discretionary power can be deduced
from legislative history, related cases and statutes, and the purpose and
intent of the statute itself. A new rule of relevance to support the
exercise of discretionary power, despite absence of specific statutory
authority, has been forged out of these elements. The trend towards
acquiescence in broad delegations of authority to administrative bodies
and discovering, upon judicial review, a wide assortment of powers
spreading umbrella-like over the administrative terrain, continues to
receive judicial approval." 2
108. 126 N.Y. at 482, 27 NX.. at 967.
109. 286 N.Y. 202, 36 N.E.2d 113 (1941).
110. 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N.E.2d 281 (1938).
111. 273 N.Y. 44, 6 N.E.2d 91 (1936). See also Packer Collegiate Institute v. University
of the State of N.Y., 298 N.Y. 184, 81 N.E.2d 80 (1948); Lyons v. Prince, 281 N.Y. 557, 24
N.E.2d 466 (1939); Levine v. O'Connell, 275 App. Div. 217, 88 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1st Dep't
1949), aff'd mer. 300 N.Y. 658, 91 N.E.2d 322 (1950).
112. Chiropractic Ass'n, Inc. v. Hilleboe, 12 N.Y.2d 109, 187 N.E.2d 756, 237 N.Y.S.2d
289 (1962); National Psychological Ass'n for Psychoanalysis, Inc. v. University of the State
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A recent case on administrative discretion, Lemir Realty Corp. v.

Larkhzn, 3 decided by the court of appeals, indicates that in matters of
discretion an attitude of judicial restraint in deference to administrative judgment continues to predominate. The high court in that case an-

nounced: "The courts do not sit to supervise the discretionary acts of
the hundreds of town boards and town zoning boards in this State.""14

It was emphasized that courts were without "original jurisdiction" in
proceedings brought to review the refusal of a town board to grant a
special exception for the construction of a gasoline service station. The
legislature had conferred that function of government upon the local

body. "Reasonableness" remains the ultimate test in article 78 review
of the exercise of discretion, and the courts can only consider whether
the reasons given for the action taken "were lawful ones or such as

reasonable minds could act on.""' The town board had given five reasons

for denying the petitioner's application, but each of these reasons was
rejected by the court at special term.n" In the court of appeals, the
test of reasonableness was taken to mean that unless patently invalid as
reasons, i.e., to outrage common sense," 7 they must be accepted by the
reviewing court, else "the Judges have taken over the duties and powers

of the board.""'

This is a rather pointed expression of how strong the

tide is running against more than limited judicial inquiry into exercise

of administrative discretion.
A distinctive feature of Lemir Realty and the case it largely relied

upon, Larkin Co. v. Scnvab,"2 is the fact that in both instances the
of N.Y., 8 N.Y.2d 197, 16S N.E.2d 649, 203 N.Y.S.2d 821, appeal disaiied per curiam, 365
U.S. 29S (1961); City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., S N.Y.2d 164, 156 N.E.2d
301, 1S2 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1959); d. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
156, 167 (1962); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1953). '"Deliberate ambiguity [in the
drafting of legislation] is a device for delegating authority to administrators and judges."
Newman, A Legal Look at Congress and the State Legislatures, in Legal Institutions Today
and Tomorrow 67, 75 (Paulsen ed. 1959). Accord, Darweger v. Steats, 267 N.Y. 290, .306,
196 N.E. 61, 66 (1935). For a view contrary to the current trend, see Friendly, The Federal
Administrative Agencies 21-22, 166-67 (1962). Paradoxically, as additional areas of administrative action have been brought within judicial purview, a useful tool for testing and
evaluating the exercise of such administrative discretion has been blunted by the wider
delgations of power to administrative bodies. The courts are virtually helpless to enter into
these areas of administrative discretion because the broad grants of power can conveniently
withstand judicial probing of legislative aim and purpose.
113. 11 N.Y.2d 20, 181 N.E.2d 407, 226 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1962).
114. Id. at 24, 181 N.E.2d at 409, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
115. Id. at 25, 181 N.E.2d at 409, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
116. 195 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
117. 11 N.Y.2d at 25, 181 N.E.2d at 409, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
118. Ibid.
119. 242 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926).
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discretion to act rested with a legislative body which exercised administrative powers in the specific instances under review. Although action
by a legislative body is now held subject to judicial review in such
instances, 20 it appears that the courts tend to show more deference and
yield much greater scope for the exercise of such discretion than would
normally be accorded to similar action by a strictly administrative
body.' 2 ' For this reason the great reliance placed upon the Larkin Co. v.
Schwab holding in dealing with matters of administrative discretion is
not wholly warranted. Just as the court of appeals in Barton122 fortified
itself by copious quotations from Schwab v. Grant,'- the decision in
Lemir Realty is likewise founded upon persuasive excerpts from Larkin
Co. v. Schwab. 24 This is an established technique of common law judicature, but the technique should be used carefully and selectively. Reliance
upon historically outmoded cases such as Schwab v. Grant introduces an
eccentric element into the development of a body of administrative law
seeking to cope with rapid changes. Reliance upon excerpts from outmoded case law authorities, e.g., Schwab v. Grant, only perverts the value
of case law citations. 2 5
A prime example of the dangers inherent in the tendency to premise a decision upon a cogent, but inapposite, quotation is found in
Stracquadaniov. Department of Health. 20 There, an oft-quoted judicial
test for determining the validity of administrative exercise of discretionary power is stated to be "limited to a determination whether the record
discloses circumstances which leave no possible scope for the reasonable
exercise of that discretion in the manner of which the appellant complains.' 2 7 Superficially, the quotation seems to accurately reflect the
rule of reasonableness which the courts have applied as the test for the
valid exercise of administrative discretion in recent decades. In point
120. See Rothstein v. County Operating Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 728, 158 N.E.2d 507, 185
N.Y.S.2d 813 (1959) (memorandum decision); Mastrangelo v. State Council of Parks, 22
App. Div. 2d 947, - N.Y.S.2d - (2d Dep't 1964) (memorandum decision); Shell Oil Co. v.
Farrington, 19 App. Div. 2d 555, 241 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dep't 1963) (memorandum decision).
For cases exemplifying the earlier rule of legislative immunity from judicial review on questions of judgment or discretion, see Neddo v. Schrade, 270 N.Y. 97, 200 N.E. 657 (1936)
(certiorari,; Ciresi v. Newcomb, 244 App. Div. 760, 279 N.Y. Supp. 269 (4th Dep't 1935)
(per curiam) (mandamus). Cf. People ex rel. Baird v. Board of Supervisors, 138 N.Y. 95,
33 N.E. 827 (1893).
121.

Cf. Seignious v. Rice, 273 N.Y. 44, 6 N.E.2d 91 (1936).

122.

7 N.Y.2d 299, 165 N.E.2d 163, 197 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1959).

123.
124.
125.
126.

126
242
See
285

127.

Id. at 96, 32 N.E.2d at 808.

N.Y. 473, 27 N.E. 964 (1891).
N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926).
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934)
N.Y. 93, 32 N.E.2d 806 (1941).

(Cardozo, J.).
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of fact, the quotation has no substantial relevance to the decision which
was reached in the Stracquadanio case. Of greater significance is the
fact that the major part of the quotation originated under circumstances
which were not concerned with the question of reasonableness in the
exercise of administrative discretion of an adjudicatory nature. The
major point at issue hinged on the reasonableness of a classification made
by the Department of Health and embodied in a regulation issued by it.
In Stracquadanio the petitioner and others, similarly situated, were
aggrieved by defendant's denial of a permit to deliver milk in New York
City as independent milk dealers. Such permits were issued pursuant to
previously issued regulations. Because the first two categories of the
regulations issued by defendant patently precluded issuance of a permit
to petitioner and seemed to be based upon a reasonable classification,
he sought a Class C permit. This type of permit required prior
activity as an independent, individual milk distributor in the city before
June 1, 1939, under which petitioner failed to qualify by reason of the
cut-off date. The lower court had refused his application for mandamus,"
and in the court of appeals he attacked the regulation as a violation of
the state and federal constitutions. 9
It was shown by defendant that the distribution of milk required the
exercise of police power; that serious problems of inspection are presented
where depots are not used; unsanitary practices creep in where marginal
distributors seek to gain a foothold in the highly competitive milk business. Clearly, the question presented to the court revolved more about
the rule-making power to issue the Class C regulation than about defendant's exercise of discretion in denying the permit in petitioner's
particular case. Nevertheless, a former Attorney General of the State
of New York has noted that the foregoing quotation has been cited extensively as the leading test for evaluating the reasonableness of the
exercise of administrative discretion. 30 However, the inapposite quotation
is not the only incongruity in Stracquadanio, for there is also the unwarranted technique whereby the quoted formula was transformed into
the standard description for testing reasonableness of exercise of administrative discretion upon judicial review. The case to which the
3 ' The Durr
quotation owes its origin is Durr v. Paragon Trading Corp.1
123. 20 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1940), affd per curiam, 259 App. Div. 994, 20 N.Y.S.2d
965 (1st Dep't 1940).
129. 235 N.Y. at 95, 32 N.E.2d at S07.

130. Goldstein, Judicial Review of Administrative Action Through Article 73 of the
Civil Practice Act (1937-1951), 2 Syracuse L. Rev. 199, 204-05 (1951). See also Roclover
v. State Liquor Authority, 4 N.Y.2d 12S, 131, 149 N.E.2d 512, 514, 173 N.Y3.2d 5, 3 (1958).
131. 270 N.Y. 464, 1 N.E.2d 967 (1936).
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case involved an application for mandamus to compel defendant to permit
petitioner to inspect books and records of defendant corporation in an
effort to establish claims of waste and mismanagement. The application
was granted at special term.
In the court of appeals where defendant corporation was the appellant,
it maintained that its affidavits of denial and its pleaded defenses should
have precluded issuance of the peremptory mandamus by the lower
court until the truth of petitioner's allegations was established upon
a trial of the issues. The appeal accordingly resolved itself into a question
of whether the lower court was justified in exercising its judicial discretion by issuing a mandamus in petitioner's behalf without affording
defendant an opportunity to sustain its denials and defenses. The court
of appeals observed that mandamus issues only for enforcement of a
clear, legal right (viz., stockholders have a right to inspect the corporate
books for a proper purpose), after which the court must determine
whether it will, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, grant or
withhold the order. Then follows the notable sentence which ultimately
found its way into Stracquadanio as a definition of judicial abuse of
discretion under certain conditions: "Denial of an application for the
order [of mandamus] constitutes an abuse of discretion, as matter of
law, in those rare cases, only, where the circumstances leave no possible
scope for the reasonable exercise of discretion in such manner ....M82
The court of appeals thereby expressed a rule to govern the judicial
review of the exercise of discretion by a court; it was not designed to
serve as a guide upon judicial review of administrative discretion. The
vice of applying a test for the exercise of judicial discretion to the
infinitely more complex field of administrative discretion is that the
factors to be considered in judging the validity of the action in these
respective instances are largely dissimilar. 13 3 First, Durr involved a
matter of private right between private parties where no question of
public law was involved. Second, the posture of the pleadings in this
private litigation, to a large extent, governed the disposition of the
ultimate decision reached by the court. Another decisive distinction must
be the continuing responsibility which devolves upon an administrative
body acting within a specified statutory scheme; certainly, the narrow,
legal questions involved in a private suit cannot be normally assimilated
to the magnitude and ramifications of the former. Public policy often
dictates differing distinctions in the treatment of public and private legal
questions, and, in recognition of these distinctions, the court retains a
132. Id. at 469, 1 N.E.2d at 969.
133. See Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative
Process, 28 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 78 (1959).
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discretion in public law matters involving the prerogative writs which is
not normally available in private litigation. It follows, therefore, that
there was no true analogy in applying the same yardstick for measuring
the reasonableness of judicial discretion in issuing mandamus in private
litigation as contrasted with the broad public considerations, including
statutory purposes and powers, which are necessarily involved in reviewing an administrative act of discretion. Durr was a narrow holding,
on the pleadings, in a private case dealing solely with an act of judicial
discretion; the propriety of administrative action was entirely foreign
to the case.
Although Small v. Moss3 and Coombs v. Edwards,1 5 which followed
Durr, did deal with mandamus involving administrative bodies, the
foregoing quotation was invoked solely to express the test for review in
the court of appeals of judicial discretion exercised below, and not
administrative discretion. Its subtle transition from the judicial to the
administrative sphere came, without acknowledgment of the disparate
origin, in Sck-wvab v. McEligott, 36 a case involving a fireman's claim to
a disability pension. The respondent had moved to dismiss the mandamustype application before answering, and consequently the court treated
petitioner's allegations of fact as true for the purpose of reviewing, on
appeal, the granting of a motion to dismiss. In this posture of the case,
the factual circumstances surrounding the denial of petitioner's pension
were not before the court, thereby entirely removing the question of
respondent's reasonableness of action from the case. Nonetheless, the
quotation from Durr was adopted to serve as the main prop for the
opinion despite the fact that the quotation purports to state a rule for
reviewing "the exercise of a discretionary power vested in an administrative officer or body .... " 3 7
Surprisingly, the next following case, Pruzan v. Valentine,s3 used the
quotation for its original purpose, i.e., to test the exercise of judicial discretion below. 3 ' Then follows Stracquadanio,and the quotation is transformed into a formula which takes its place as one of the authoritative
standards for measuring, upon judicial review, the reasonableness of
the exercise of administrative discretion. The Stracquadanio quotation,
standing by itself, certainly appears to offer a workable formula for
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

277
2S0
2S2
Id.
282
Id.

N.Y. 501,
N.Y. 361,
N.Y. 182,
at 186, 26
N.Y. 49S,
at 501, 27

513, 14 N.E.2d SOS, 313 (193S).
364, 21 N.E.2d 353, 354 (1939).
26 N.E.2d 10 (1940).
N.E.2d at 12.
27 N.E.2d 25 (1940).
N.E.2d at 26.
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evaluating reasonableness and is, in fact, extensively cited for that
purpose, but it can claim no merit by reason of legitimate origin. 40
Civil service matters have long provided a prolific source for insight
into the anatomy of administrative reasonableness as viewed by the
courts. 4 ' In the specialized field of preparing examinations for prospective public employees or promotion examinations for civil service
employees, the courts have generally exhibited reluctance to interfere
with this type of administrative discretion. Where the question of proper
subject matter for an examination given to accountants was raised in
Pollak v. Conway,4 ' the court's decision indicated that civil service
authorities will be accorded a wide range of choice. It explained the
reason for this as follows:
The argument, one way or the other, seems to us to present an administrative and
not a judicial question. Even if we were strongly persuaded that the petitioner is
right about what the scope and content of the examination should be .. .we would
not be justified in interfering with an administrative determination based on a
different view of what kind of examination would be better.
To reach the conclusion that the commission was wrong in framing this kind of
an examination for this kind of a position in the sense in which a court could interfere, we would have to say that the decision to give this examination wag arbitrary
and capricious which is fairly close to saying no reasonable man would have regarded
this examination as appropriate ....
This case is a fairly good illustration of the problem at the bottom of judicial
review of administrative acts. Even if the scope of judicial power were very broadmuch broader than we have yet thought admissible in this State-the court would
exercise the power very sparingly.
This is not because of a sense of self-abnegation or undue restraint in respect of
judicial power. It is because judges are not technically equipped to be administrators,
and a judicially administered government would be a creaking and cumbersome
affair. . . .The success of judicial review has rested more on the implications of its
existence and availability than upon an explicit exercise of power. 1'i8

The trend toward viewing debatable questions of judgment and discretion which arise in the field of civil service administration as "an
140. Cf. Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in Legal Institutions Today
and Tomorrow 48, 52 (Paulsen ed. 1959): "Every basic precedent was thus once made up
out of whole cloth woven by a judge."
141. Among the early cases of this century, see People ex rel. Moriarty v. Creelman,
206 N.Y. 570, 100 N.E. 446 (1912); Simons v. McGuire, 204 N.Y. 253, 97 N.E. 526 (1912);
People ex rel. Schau v. McWilliams, 185 N.Y. 92, 77 N.E. 785 (1906); People ex rel. Sims
v. Collier, 175 N.Y. 196, 67 N.E. 309 (1903); People ex rel. Mack v. Burt, 170 N.Y. 620,
63 N.E. 1121 (1902) (memorandum decision).
142. 276 App. Div. 435, 95 N.Y.S.2d 553 (3d Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied,
301 N.Y. 816, 93 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
143. 276 App. Div. at 437-38, 95 N.Y.S.2d at 555-56.
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administrative and not a judicial
question" has been consistently followed
44
since Schau v. MctrWilliams.1

In the main, absent a showing of bad faith,'

departure from the

statutory or constitutional requirements,""" or arbitrary action, 1at the

courts have refused to interfere with the discretion exercised in this
field of specialization.'

A threshold showing, in most instances, of

administrative action resting on some reasonable foundation suffices to
limit further judicial inquiry.14 9 This test applies to every sphere of

administrative activity subject to judicial review under CPLR 7803 (3).
The "reasonableness" test, whether stated in terms of rationality or
relevancy,lzo now pervades the entire area of judicial review of adminis-

trative discretion. An example taken from the closely controlled field of
liquor regulation will illustrate how far the rule of reasonableness can
be stretched so long as it exhibits a tolerable degree of relevancy.
In Wager v. State Liquor Atzthority, 0' the court of appeals reversed

special term

2

and the appellate division5 3 and sustained disapproval

of the renewal of a liquor salesman's license on the basis of questionable

relationships. The State Liquor Authority alleged that the intermingling
144. 185 N.Y. 92, 77 N.E. 785 (1906).
145. O'Reilly v. Grumet, 303 N.Y. 351, 126 N.E.2d 275 (1955) (dictum); Turd v.
Delaney, 285 N.Y. 16, 32 N.E.2d 774 (1941); McCanless v. Brieant, 19 App. Div. 2d 736,
242 N.Y.S.2d 41 (2d Dep't 1963) (memorandum decision) (semble).
146. Shpritzer v. Lang, 17 App. Div. 2d 235, 234 N.YS.2d 235 (1st Dep't 1962), afd
mem. 13 N.Y.2d 744, 191 N.E2d 919, 241 N.Y.S.2d S69 (1963).
147. Acosta v. Lang, 13 N.Y.2d 1079, 196 N.E.2d 60, 246 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1963); Gruner
v. McNamara, 293 N.Y. 395, 33 N.E.2d 350 (1949) (per curiam).
148. Wirberger v. Watson, 305 N.Y. 507, 114 N.E.2d 15 (1953); Blumenthal v. Morton,
273 App. Div. 497, 73 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem. 293 N.A. 563, 81 N.E.2d 102
(1943).
149. Albano v. Hammond, 263 N.Y. 104, 196 N.E. 759 (1935) ; Kayfield Constr. Corp. v.
Morris, 15 App. Div. 2d 373, 373, 225 N.Y.S.2d 507, 517 (1st Dep't 1962); Freymann v.
Weaver, S App. Div. 2d 704, 135 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1st Dep't 1959) (memorandum dedcion);
Delicati v. Schechter, 3 App. Div. 2d 19, 24, 157 N.Y.S.2d 715, 720-21 (Ist Dep't 1956).
150. Friedman v. Weaver, 3 N.Y.2d 123, 143 N.E.2d 803, 164 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1957);
Fink v. Cole, 1 N.Y.2d 48, 53, 133 N.E.2d 691, 694, 150 N.Y.S.2d 175, 179 (1956); King
v. O'Connell, 230 App. Div. S52, 113 N.Y.S.2d 329 (3d Dep't 1952) (memorandum decicion);
Campo Corp. v. Feinberg, 279 App. Div. 302, 110 N.Y.S.2d 250 (3d Dep't 1952); cf. Nev,
York Univ. v. Temporary State Housing Rent Comm'n, 304 N.Y. 124, 105 N.E.2d 44 (1952);
Playboy Club, Inc. v. Hostetter, 19 App. Div. 2d 322, 243 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Ist Dep't 1963)
(memorandum decision), aff'd mem. 14 N.Y.2d 933, 200 N.E.2d 363, 252 N.Y.S2d 323
(1964); Ciccdo v. O'Connell, 17 App. Div. 2d 771, 232 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Ist Dep't 1962)
(memorandum decision).
151. 4 N.Y2d 465, 151 N.E.2d 869, 176 N.YS.2d 311 (1953) (per curiam).
152. 151 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sup. CL 1956).
153.

3 App. Div. 2d 934, 163 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (2d Dep't 1957) (memorandum dc&ison).
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of petitioner's other activities as owner of a vending machine company
and two automobile agencies with his liquor-selling work was incompatible with his responsibilities under the law and not conducive to
proper regulation and control. There was no record of a violation of any
provision of law, any rule of the State Liquor Authority or of any
misconduct on the part of the petitioner. Nevertheless, the court viewed
the liquor authority's disapproval of renewal of petitioner's solicitor
of discretion falling "within the compass of
permit as a permissible ' act
1 4
its discretionary power. ; 5
It is plain that the administrative agency will be accorded the necessary discretionary power to keep its house in order, i.e., to be allowed,
within the realm of reasonable possibility, to pursue appropriate action.
This is sanctioned by the courts irrespective of whether the basis is
derived from explicit statutory provision or from powers regarded as
implicit in the nature of the functions to be performed by the agency
under legislative mandate. Although the exercise of authority derived
from implicit power may bring administrative discretion to the perimeter
need only have a ring of plausible relevancy
of impermissible action, it
5
in order to be sustained.'
The prevailing judicial attitude of self-restraint, of not weighing or
deciding but only examining for legal error, should not be viewed as an
abdication of responsibility. In circumstances where a stronger line had
to be taken, the courts have demonstrated that they can respond to the
needs of the community or the individual. In Shakespeare Workshop v.
Moses,'56 a case which attracted considerable public attention, respondent
New York City Park Commissioner refused to issue a park permit to
petitioner to present Shakespeare's plays in Central Park free of
charge. The ground of denial was petitioner's refusal to impose an
admission charge for the performances. The appellate division reversed
dismissal of the petition below, holding that respondent's insistence upon
an admission charge was not a "rational basis" for denying the permit.
Although the park commissioner exercises a "wide discretion" in the
issuance of park permits, no useful park purpose was served by an
admission charge and, therefore, such a requirement was "arbitrary,
154. 4 N.Y.2d at 468, 151 N.E.2d at 870, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 313; accord, Graziani v. Rohan,
10 App. Div. 2d 154, 198 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1st Dep't), aff'd mer. 8 N.Y.2d 967, 169 N.E,Zd 8,
204 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1960).
155. See Monachino v. New York State Liquor Authority, 6 App. Div. 2d 378, 178
N.Y.S.2d 22 (4th Dep't 1958) (per curiam); cf. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408
(2d Cir. 1960).
156. 8 App. Div. 2d 343, 187 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1st Dep't 1959). See Schwartz, Adninistrative Law, 1959 Survey of N.Y. Law, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1374, 1382-83 (1959).
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capricious and unreasonable."''x1 What is especially interesting in this
decision is that the appellate division could have washed its hands of
the entire matter by imposing the "clear, legal right" requirementcs
upon petitioner and terminated the litigation on the basis of that wellestablished requirement.
In other areas of administrative judgment and discretion, the courts
have been equally sensitive to changed conditions and new trends. Despite
long administrative practice, approved by appellate courts, of providing
separate civil service lists for each sex, an eligible on a principal's list
for elementary schools brought suit in Lichcnstcht v. Jansenc9 to set
aside the establishment of two separate lists based on sex. In an exhaustive opinion which overruled prior legal precedents and rejected the
reasons advanced by top New York City school officials, the two-list
practice was stricken as arbitrary and capricious. Even in the closely
regulated field of liquor control, the courts have not hesitated to step
in and set aside administrative action which had no factual support,cO
or where it was determined that the State Liquor Authority had failed
to consider all relevant factors. 6'
Throughout the cases which have been examined above, there existed
a difference of opinion as to the propriety of an administrative act of
judgment or discretion with regard to a problem which the administrator
faced and decided initially. This conffict arose because the legislature
gave to the administrator the responsibility for solving the problem in
light of a legislatively declared policy. When the administrator acted, it
represented an act of government as truly legitimate as that of the governor, the legislature or the judiciary, each acting within its own sphere
of assigned legal competence.
In discussing the administrative function in such a context, the United
States Supreme Court has stated:
It is the [Federal Power] Commission's judgment on which Congress has placed its
reliance for control of licenses ....
When the court decided that the license should
157. S App. Div. 2d at 347, 137 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
158. Pruzan v. Valentine, 2S2 N.Y. 49S, 27 N.E.2d 25 (1940).
159. 4 App. Div. 2d 465, 167 N.Y.S.2d 31 (Ist Dep't 1957), aff'd mem. S N.Y.2d 995, 157
N.E.2d 728, 1S4 N.Y.S.2d S57 (1959).
160. Camperlengo v. State Liquor Authority, 16 App. Div. 2d 342, 228 N.Y.S.2d 115
(1st Dep't 1962); W1anetick v. State Liquor Authority, S App. Div. 2d 705, 185 N.Y.S.2d
690 (1st Dep't 1959) (memorandum decision); cf. Rockower v. State Liquor Authority, 4
N.Y.2d 128, 149 N.E.2d 512, 173 N.Y.S.2d 5 (195S). See also Winkler v. State Liquor Authority, 3 App. Div. 2d 1011, 164 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1st Dep't 1957) (memorandum decision),
aff'd mem. 4 N.Y.2d 856, 150 N.E.2d 246, 173 N.Y.S.2d 822 (195S).
161. Mlliamson v. New York State Liquor Authority, 14 N.Y.2d 360, 20D N.E2d 56S,
251 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1964).
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issue without the conditions, it usurped an administrative function. . . . [because]
02
the Commission is plainly made the guardian of the public domain.'

Mr. Justice Douglas, erstwhile law professor and top echelon administrator who has served in high judicial office since 1939, is eminently
qualified to elucidate the role of the administrative agency in balanced
perspective. He said, in 1959:
Today the administrative agency is supreme in state and federal governments ...
The administrative agency fulfills an essential role in a government that promises
to be no less dependent on it in the future than in the past. . . . The administrative
agencies will continue to be important referees in the clash of private versus public
interests. They will continue to be the repositories of a vast discretion which it is
163
necessary to lodge somewhere.

A leading New York jurist, Judge Francis Bergan, now sitting in the
court of appeals, has also recognized the pervasive power and authority
which has been increasingly delegated to the administrative agency. He
has essayed the task of identifying some of the factors which impinge
upon the judicial mind engaged in the process of reviewing administrative
action.
There exists on the judicial side of the work a certain detachment from the heat of
the quarrel, an objectivity that neither contestant is expected to feel but which both
sides expect the judge to have. This allows the judge to see patiently the administrative action complained of in the light of historic and of future power and the
effect of that power on the community and the laws of the community; and it implies
that the judge has the insight to see that even if he would do the administrator's
work differently he would not necessarily undo it in the case at hand.
The process of judicial review involves the judge projecting himself into the place
of the administrator and learning that there are admissible viewpoints in the adminis.
trator's work which may be quite different from some that the judge thinks of as important; and admissible policies and decisions to which the judge, had he full freedom
0 4
of action, might not subscribe but which he deems necessary to sustain on review.'

There is no talisman to penetrate to the ultimate answer, as Judge
Bergan, sounding a clear warning in the same opinion, points out.
Satisfactory definitive terms to give sure footing to the tread of future cases have
never been formulated. No one has been able clearly to mark out in advance the
162. FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20, 23 (1952). See also BeeLine, Inc. v.
Feinberg, 7 App. Div. 2d 814, 815, 180 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (3d Dep't 1958) (memorandum
decision); Vivana Realty Corp. v. Abrams, 5 App. Div. 2d 466, 172 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st
Dep't 1958).
163. Douglas, Legal Institutions in America, in Legal Institutions Today and Tomorrow,
274-75 (Paulsen ed. 1959).
164. Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 280 App. Div. 260, 263-64, 114
N.Y.S.2d 561, 564 (3d Dep't 1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953), rev'd on
constitutional grounds per curiam, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
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exact point where a judge will interfere, and separate it from the area in which he
will not interfere, with what the administrator has done.C 5

The recent revision of New York practice and procedure, resulting in
the adoption of the Civil Practice Law and Rules,";" likewise offers little

comfort in providing clear-cut answers to deep-rooted problems arising
from judicial review of administrative action involving discretion.'i
"Discretion," from earliest days, has engaged the attention of centuries
of judges and jurists;16 the quest has failed to yield a formula meet for
all times and all seasons. The persistence and intractability of the problem has been summed up best by Dean Roscoe Pound who stated: "Al-

most all of the problems of jurisprudence come down to a fundamental
one of rule and discretion ....,"10 Dean Pound's observation implies

that law and discretion stand in opposition, which contains more than a
grain of truth. By tradition and technique, the courts have gravitated
towards establishing a definite rule, while administrative agencies have
sought the protection of discretion to meet new, unanticipated problems;
the exercise of that discretion is the visible expression of legislative policy
which committed power to the agency to grapple with complex, fluctuating
conditions. The rigidity of legal precedents and the limitations imposed
by court procedures render judicial tribunals unsuitable for such tasks.
The increased diversion of power and authority to administrative
agencies, accompanied by broad grants of discretion, does not necessarily lead to "administrative absolutism." The foregoing discussion
shows that where the factors singled out as the basis for the exercise of
discretion by the agency are not authorized by law, explicitly or by
implication, are remote or are not relevant or rational, or where agency
action is not supported by any evidence, or where agency procedure has
not conformed to current standards of fairness, or where changed conditions have impaired the validity of agency policy and discretion, the
165. 2S0 App. Div. at 262, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
166. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 30S.
167. "While acknowledging the advisability of substituting an entirely ne, statute, the
advisory committee considers such a task beyond the scope of its authority; accordingly,
it has left the underlying law dealing with the prerogative writs intact, restricting its efforts
to a simplification and clarification of present provisions." Second Preliminary Report of the
Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, N.Y. Leg. Doe. No. 13, p. 395 (1953).
16S. "[N]otwithstanding the words of the commission give authority to the commissioners to do according to their discretions, yet their proceedings ought to be limited and
bound with the rule of reason and laxv.... and not to do according to their vills and
private affections . . . " Rooke's Case, S Co. 99b, 100a, 77 Eng. Rep. 2019, 210 (C.P. 1S99).
See also Weintraub, English Origins of judicial Review by Prerogative Writ: Certiorari and
Mandamus, 9 N.Y.L.F. 473, 500 (1963).
169. Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 111 (1922).
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courts have intervened to set aside the exercise of agency discretion as
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. A serious consideration frequently
arises from court intervention because the rule enunciated by the court
enters into the administrative scheme as a fixed, unchanged factor. The
agency, on the other hand, is always free to shift emphasis from one
factor to another as changing conditions may warrant.17 °
In the end, however, agency discretion is constantly brought back to
the rule of law by judicial oversight. It stands to the credit of the judiciary
that this intervention has been moderated by a high degree of judicial
statesmanship because, as Chief Judge Desmond emphasized in Lemir
Realty, 1 ' "original jurisdiction" belongs to the agency. Both agency and
court have separate and distinct "jurisdictions" to administer in contemporary government. As problems increasingly bring these "jurisdictions"
into closer working propinquity, resulting in greater skill and increased
understanding, many of the difficulties which beset the uses of discretion
will be clarified and resolved.
170. Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law 130-49 (1959 reprint).
See also Alamac Estates, Inc. v. McGoldrick, 2 N.Y.2d 87, 138 N.E.2d 231, 156 N.Y.S.2d
853 (1956); Larkin Co. v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926); People ex rel.

Schau v. McWilliams, 185 N.Y. 92, 99, 77 N.E. 785, 787 (1906).
171. Lemir Realty Corp. v. Larkin, 11 N.Y.2d 20, 24, 181 N.E.2d 407, 409, 226 N.Y.S.2d
374, 376 (1962). See also Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion, 47
Yale L.J. 577, 600 (1938).

